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I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This is a non-jury deceptive trade practices lawsuit in which the only remaining 
defendants are a defunct affiliate marketing network (LeadClick) and its parent company.  The 
operative complaint1 contains myriad allegations about the misleading advertising practices of 
the LeanSpa2 defendants, who allegedly sold ineffective “weight-loss” products to consumers 
through allegedly deceptive web-based “free trial” offers, using deceptive guarantees and refund 
claims.3  But Plaintiffs’ claims against LeanSpa and its allegedly deceptive sales practices have 
nothing to do with LeadClick.4  The sole claim Plaintiffs assert against LeadClick contends that 
the company is somehow responsible for certain specific misrepresentations made by 
independent third-party “affiliate marketers”—also called “publishers”—who used online “news 
sites” to promote LeanSpa products. 
In particular, Plaintiffs allege that LeadClick is responsible for two, and only two, aspects 
of these “news site” advertisements in that the websites: a) purport to be legitimate news 
websites; and b) contain comments that purport to express the views of real consumers.5  But 
LeadClick had no involvement in the design or publication of these “news site” advertisements; 
it neither made nor adopted any statement contained in any advertisement, and no statement in 
any advertisement is attributed to or even mentions LeadClick.  As a matter of law, LeadClick is 
                                                 
 
1 Third Amended Complaint (“Compl.”) [ECF No 246]. 
2 LeanSpa refers to LeanSpa, LLC, NutraSlim, LLC, and NutraSlim U.K., Ltd., and their owner, 
Boris Mizhen. 
3 Compl. at ¶¶ 73–81, 85–121, 129–143 (Counts 1–3, 5–12, 15–16). 
4 LeadClick refers, collectively, to LeadClick Media, Inc. and its successor, LeadClick Media, 
LLC. 
5 Compl. at ¶¶ 82-84 (Count 4). 
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not responsible for the use of such websites by independent third-party publishers. 
In resolving this motion, the Court need only address four straightforward issues.  If the 
Court finds in LeadClick’s favor on any one of the following issues, entry of an order granting 
this motion for summary judgment in LeadClick’s favor is proper and no bench trial is necessary. 
1) LeadClick is not liable for a violation of the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) Act or the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (“CUTPA”).  Under Second 
Circuit law, a defendant may only be held liable for allegedly deceptive statements that the 
defendant has either personally made or adopted.  There is no “aiding and abetting” liability 
under the FTC Act.  All witnesses in this case—including the FTC’s own investigators—agree 
that LeadClick neither created nor contributed to the “news sites” utilized by publishers who 
were members of LeadClick’s eAdvertising affiliate network, that no claims in those 
advertisements are attributed to LeadClick, and that the “news site” advertisements do not even 
identify LeadClick.  As a result, LeadClick cannot be liable under the FTC Act or the CUTPA. 
2) LeadClick provided a content-neutral software platform as an intermediary 
between publishers and merchants, and is thus entitled to immunity under the 
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (the “CDA”).  The CDA immunizes 
LeadClick from liability for the content of any of the “news sites” used by independent third-
party publishers that joined LeadClick’s affiliate marketing network.  The unrebutted testimony 
of one of the nation’s leading forensic experts, together with the testimony of the creator of 
LeadClick’s affiliate network software platform, conclusively demonstrates that LeadClick meets 
the statutory definition of an “interactive computer service.”  Thus, LeadClick is immune from 
liability and cannot be held responsible for the allegedly deceptive content of any of the third-
party publisher “news sites.” 
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3) The monetary relief sought by plaintiffs is improper because LeadClick is 
defunct.  Pursuant to Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), the FTC’s enforcement 
authority in federal court is predicated on the statutory language authorizing the agency to seek 
permanent injunctions.  The power to award equitable monetary relief is ancillary to the power to 
enjoin and may not be used when an injunction is improper.  LeadClick is a defunct company 
that ceased operating in late 2011.  There is no prospect that LeadClick will resume any 
operations.  Because a permanent injunction is improper as a matter of law, equitable monetary 
relief is a legally improper remedy. 
4) Any monetary relief must be limited to disgorgement of retained funds.  
Although restitutionary relief is based on gross revenues, a party cannot be ordered to repay 
consumer funds that it was contractually required to disburse to others.  Here, LeadClick was 
contractually obligated to, and did, pay publishers millions of dollars more than it ever received 
from LeanSpa, because LeanSpa failed to pay its obligations to LeadClick.  Any consumer funds 
LeadClick did receive from LeanSpa were long ago disbursed to publishers to whom 
commissions were due.  Notably, the FTC has already recovered million-dollar settlements in 
independent lawsuits the agency filed against some of these publishers.  Because LeadClick lost 
over $5 million as a result of the publishers’ advertising of LeanSpa products through its 
network, and because the company does not hold any consumer funds, restitutionary relief is 
improper. 
II. SUMMARY OF FACTS 
LeadClick Media, LLC is a subsidiary of CoreLogic, Inc., and is the successor to 
LeadClick Media, Inc., the entity that operated the affiliate marketing network until the 
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company’s closure in September 2011.  LeadClick’s affiliate marketing network was operated 
through the company’s “eAdvertising” division. 6 
A. LeadClick’s eAdvertising Division Operated an Affiliate Marketing Network 
 Affiliate marketing is a very common practice of Internet-based advertising.  
Affiliate marketing campaigns involve compensating individuals or other business entities 
(commonly referred to industrywide as  “publishers” or “affiliates”) for their marketing efforts 
on behalf of online retailers (referred to as “merchants”) who sell goods or services to 
consumers.7 
Publishers advertise online in a variety of ways—email marketing, banner ads and 
search-engine placement are all methods utilized by publishers to promote merchants’ products 
to consumers.  Likewise, publishers can and do create their own websites to promote merchants’ 
products.  Regardless of the marketing technique employed by a particular publisher, a critical 
element in all affiliate marketing is to provide a technical mechanism by which an interested 
consumer’s “click” on a publisher’s advertisement can be tracked and routed to a merchant’s 
website (“landing page”).8 
An affiliate marketing network is a business that acts as an intermediary between 
publishers and merchants.  By having a variety of merchant offerings, an affiliate program allows 
                                                 
 
6 See Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement in Support of LeadClick Defendants’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment (“Statement”) ¶ 1 [Balas Decl.  ¶¶ 3-5; Livermore Dep. Ex. 1 (Decl.) at ¶ 2; 
Zimmerman Decl.  ¶¶ 4, 10].  All documentary evidence in support of the motion, the 
memorandum of law, and the Statement are attached as exhibits to the Statement. 
7 Statement ¶ 5. [Stroz Report  ¶ 5; Prokop Dep. 12:7–17; Redmond Dep. 19:14–19; Chelew 
Dep. 29:21–24, 51:18–21]. 
8 Statement ¶ 6 [Stroz Report ¶ 5; Prokop Dep. 76:12–17, 80:19–23; Olsen Dep.  25:14–16; 
Redmond Dep. 34:17–35:1]. 
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publishers to more easily find and participate in advertising for particular merchants. And by 
having a pool of existing publishers, an affiliate program allows online merchants to reach more 
publishers and thereby a larger audience. The affiliate network serves as the middleman 
administering the relationship between merchants and publishers so that an interested consumer 
viewing a publisher’s advertisement can be tracked and directed to a merchant’s website.9 
The following illustration demonstrates how the LeadClick affiliate network operated to 









B. The LeanSpa Defendants 
The LeanSpa defendants operated a series of websites at which they sold to consumers 
purported weight-loss and colon-cleanse products under various brand names, including, but not 
limited to, LeanSpa™, LeanSpa™ with Acai, LeanSpa™ with HCA, and LeanSpa™ Cleanse.  
                                                 
 
9 Statement ¶ 7 [Stroz Report ¶ 6; Chelew Dep. 27:18–20, 35:17–18, 51:19–21, 161:22–162:8, 
280:20–281:10; 285:3–4; Prokop Dep. 12:13–17]. 
10 See Statement ¶ 8 [Prokop Dep. 81:21–84:3, Ex. 3]. 
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LeanSpa sold its products through websites it owned and operated, including LeanSpa.com, 
TryLeanSpa.com, and LeanSpaCleanse.com.  LeanSpa also used numerous affiliate networks to 
advertise its products and, in approximately October 2010, became a client of LeadClick.  As a 
result, publishers on LeadClick’s network were able to advertise for LeanSpa by running the 
company’s advertising campaigns.  LeadClick’s relationship with LeanSpa lasted six months, 
ending in April 2011.11 
LeanSpa allegedly sold its products to consumers through a “continuity” program.  
LeanSpa purportedly offered consumers a “free trial” of the product; if a consumer did not 
contact the company to cancel after receiving an initial supply of the product, the consumer 
would receive product shipments at a cost of $79.99 or more every month.12  LeanSpa agreed to 
pay LeadClick a set amount (between $35 and $45) for each online consumer who, having been 
directed to LeanSpa’s webpage by a LeadClick publisher, enrolled in LeanSpa’s free-trial 
program.  Of this amount, approximately 85-90% was paid to the LeadClick publisher who 
generated the particular consumer enrollment. LeanSpa was only one of numerous merchants 
who used the LeadClick affiliate marketing network.  Other LeadClick clients were merchants 
who marketed various products and services, including insurance, teeth-whitening products, 
                                                 
 
11 Statement ¶¶ 9–10 [Mizhen Dep. 23:3–7, 24–24:4, 34:5–11, 139:5–18; 140:11-16; Davidson 
Dep. 29:14–25, 59:1–20, 108:25–109:12; Chiang Dep. 131:17–19]. 
12 Statement ¶ 11 [Davidson Dep. 38:14–18, 65:20–66:1, 110:2–12; Chiang Dep. 113:7–13; 
Chelew Dep. 110:2–15, 110:17–111:4; Schools Dep. Ex. 1 at 12 [ECF 11 at 13]]. The Court may 
take judicial notice of the dates of the docket entries made in this case pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Evidence 201(b) and (c).  See, e.g., Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir. 
1991) (“courts routinely take judicial notice of documents filed in other courts, … not for the 
truth of the matters asserted in the other litigation, but rather to establish the fact of such 
litigation and related filings.”). 
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beauty products, flowers, Christmas ornaments, and holiday cards.13 
C. The Use of “News Sites” in Affiliate Marketing  
Long before any advertising relevant to this case took place, affiliate marketers were 
using so-called “news sites” to advertise various merchants’ products.  An example of one such 













The origin of these “news sites” is unknown, but it long pre-dates any activity relevant to 
                                                 
 
13 Statement ¶¶ 12–13 [Chelew Dep. 281:14–16; Davidson Dep. 42:1–10; Chiang Dep. 179:12–
181:19; Olsen Dep. 115:16–116:12; Redmond Dep. 20:14–19]. 
14 See Compl., Exhibit A; Statement ¶ 13 [Davidson Dep. 178:11–20, Ex. 6, 180:17–181:24, 
182:7–9; Schools Dep. 98:6–12]. 
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this case.15  For example, the form of “news site” shown above was utilized by publisher Andrew 
Davidson—through his company, Circa Direct, LLC (“Circa Direct”)—to advertise LeanSpa 
products through affiliate network IMM Interactive, Inc. (a/k/a Copeac), not through 
LeadClick.16 Davidson testified repeatedly and consistently that he copied “fake news” webpages 
from other publishers.17  Any content on his webpages came from other pre-existing sites he 
copied, not from LeadClick: 
Q. Now, is it accurate with regard to the fake news sites and especially the 
fake news sites that dealt with the LeanSpa ads, is it accurate to say that 
you were the person who copied these and created the content that shows 
on your own site? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you didn't get that content from any networks and you didn't get it 
from anyone at LeadClick, correct? 
A. Right.18 
One of the FTC’s own investigators, Sallie Schools, confirmed Davidson’s testimony both in her 
declaration and at her deposition.  More than a year before LeadClick was sued in this case, Ms. 
Schools examined the prolific use of these “news sites” across the web.19  She examined the 
similarities between various “news” webpages, noted identical comments and photographic 
images that appeared on many of them, ultimately finding over 33,000 web sites that shared the 
                                                 
 
15 Statement ¶ 13 [Davidson Dep. 180:17–181:24, 182:7–9; Schools Dep. 98:6–12; McKenney 
Dep.15. Ex. 1(U) (Decl.) (bates nos. FTC-LS 000189–196)] 
16 Statement ¶ 14 [Davidson Dep. 178:11–20, Ex. 6, Ex. 13 at 11] 
17 Statement ¶ 17 [Davidson Dep. 19:23–20:10, 26:11–27:5, 179:21–180:5; Circa I Dep. 54:8–
55:4]. 
18 Id. [Davidson Dep., 179:21-180:5]. 
19 Statement ¶ 19 [Schools Dep. 27:19–32:8, Ex. 1 (Declaration of Sallie S. Schools, FTC v. 
Circa Direct LLC et al, No. 11-cv-02172-RMB-AMD (D. N.J. Apr. 16, 2011)]. 
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same unique typographical error.  Ms. Schools testified that her research demonstrated that the 
“news sites” that advertised weight-loss products contain “nearly identical ‘comments’” from 
purported consumers.  She also testified that the substance of the comments “is virtually identical 
across the various websites,” and that the comments on “news sites” promoting weight-loss 
products are “substantially identical” to those appearing on “news site” advertisements 
promoting products in other industries.20 
Ms. Schools further explained that the images of the “health and diet columnists” used on 
these advertisements “are stock photographs.”  And she explained that her online research 
showed that the identical image was used on various “news format websites” and on a French-
language website for a real estate developer.  While Ms. Schools could not pin down precisely 
how many times she saw the image, she agreed that she “saw it a number of times.”21  What she 
was unable to discern through research was the origin of the format of these “news site” 
advertisements, and conceded that the FTC has no information about where publishers may have 
initially obtained the content for these pages: 
Q. Did you ever come to figure out where the format of this fake news site 
originated? 
A. I don’t know where it originated. 
… 
Q. But you don’t have any information then about how the affiliates who 
were using this site got the content for it? 
A. I don’t have any information.22 
It is undisputed that these “news sites” were created solely by third-party publishers, and 
                                                 
 
20 Statement ¶ 21 [Schools Dep. 94:7–97:16, Ex. 1 at ¶¶ 17-19]. 
21 Statement ¶ 22 [Schools Dep. 98:13–20, Ex. 1 at ¶ 20]. 
22 Statement ¶ 23 [Schools Dep., 98:6-24]. 
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were copied from sources completely unrelated to LeadClick.  LeadClick was not in any way 
involved in the creation, editing, or distribution of any “news site” advertisement used by its 
publishers.  The company did not provide any content for any “news site” and did not contribute 
in any manner to any representations suggesting either that: a) objective news reporters have 
performed independent tests demonstrating the effectiveness of the product featured; or b) the 
comments following these “news reports” express the views of independent consumers.23  “News 
sites” containing these characteristics—of supposedly objective news reports and associated 
“comments”—were widely used in affiliate marketing by publishers long before any of them 
were advertising for LeanSpa on the LeadClick network.24 
LeadClick never provided publishers with any content or other creative material to be 
used in any LeanSpa advertising campaign.25  And not only was LeadClick uninvolved with the 
content of any of the publishers’ “news sites” (specifically those websites at issue that were 
advertising LeanSpa products), but no “news site” contained any information that was publicly 
attributed to LeadClick.26  A consumer viewing a “news site” and clicking on an advertised link 
would have absolutely no awareness of LeadClick’s existence.  Because all of LeadClick’s 
activity—which consisted of managing the Internet traffic—was “behind-the-scenes,” the 
                                                 
 
23 Statement ¶ 24 [Davidson Dep. 19:23–20:10, 26:11–27:5, 179:21–180:5, 203:8–11, 204:3–7;  
Circa I Dep. 54:8–55:4; Schools Dep. 14:20–24.; Chiang Dep. 177:13–178:20, Redmond Dep. 
162:13–163:15; McKenney Dep. 173:19–25, 191:9–23]. 
24 Statement ¶ 25 [Davidson Dep. 178:24–179:8, 180:17–181:24, 182:7–9]. 
25 Statement ¶ 26 [Davidson Dep. 179:21–180:5, 203:8–11, 204:3–7; Chiang Dep. 177:13–25, 
178:17–20; Schools Dep. 14:5–8]. 
26 Statement ¶ 26 [Davidson Dep. 191:16–18, Redmond Dep. 161:12–15; McKenney Dep. 
191:9–23; Schools Dep. 14:20–24].  
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affiliate marketing process was completely invisible to a consumer.27  Indeed, the FTC’s two 
investigators in this case did not know anything about LeadClick or its operations at the time of 
their depositions.28 
D. LeadClick’s Software Platform 
LeadClick operated its affiliate network business by using the HitPath computer software 
that it licensed from Webapps, LLC. (“WebApps”).  HitPath operated on a server that WebApps 
provided to LeadClick, which server also hosted the “eadvtracker.com” domain name designated 
for LeadClick’s affiliate marketing network.29  It was this software platform that managed the 
Internet traffic from interested consumers and directed them to the merchants’ websites.  HitPath 
provided software infrastructure services that enabled a consumer to click on a publisher’s 
advertisement and be routed through LeadClick’s domain to an online merchant’s website.30 
As shown above in Illustration 1, when an Internet user clicked on a link within the 
publisher’s advertisement, the consumer was directed to the affiliate network, which in turn, 
directed the consumer to the merchant’s website.  In this manner, the affiliate network acted as 
an intermediary to redirect the consumers’ Internet traffic to the appropriate merchant site.31  
Visits to a merchant’s landing page were controlled by specific links embedded in publishers’ 
advertisements. LeadClick made available a link (or, more specifically, a URL) for each 
                                                 
 
27 Statement ¶ 28 [Davidson Dep. 191:19–22; Stroz Report ¶ 11; Prokop Dep. 21:15–21. 
28 Statement ¶ 27 [Schools Dep.13:11-24; McKenney Dep., 191:9-23]. 
29 Statement ¶ 29 [Prokop Dep. 10:7–11:1, 82:6–12; Stroz Report ¶ 13]. 
30 Statement ¶ 30 [Prokop Dep. Ex. 3, 80:2–7, 81:9–84:3; Stroz Report ¶¶ 15–17]. 
31 Statement ¶ 31 [Stroz Report ¶ 12; Prokop Dep. 79:10–14, 80:2–7, 82:23–84:3; Chelew Dep. 
35:17–18, 51:20–21, 161:22–23, 264:13–15, 280:24–281:7; McKenney Dep. 112:3–21, 113:21–
114:9]. 
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publisher that joined its affiliate network to use in its marketing efforts.  That link directed an 
Internet user to the network for financial-tracking purposes, and the user’s browser was then 
redirected to the merchant’s landing page where the consumer could consummate a transaction.32 
From a technical point of view—although invisible to the eyes of Internet users—an 
affiliate marketing program manages communications and acts as an intermediary in the 
following manner.  First, when a consumer clicks on a link in a publisher’s advertisement, the 
consumer’s browser is directed to a server operated by the affiliate network.  The affiliate 
network receives the incoming web traffic, uses the data in the communication, and redirects the 
user’s web browser to the merchant’s website. This technical process is referred to as a 
“redirect,” and its HTTP33 code is 302.  It is the combination of these Internet communications 
that allows the merchant’s site to be ultimately loaded into the consumer’s browser.34 
E. LeadClick’s Finances 
Publishers that joined LeadClick’s eAdvertising affiliate marketing network were 
compensated for sales or other actions taken by consumers who the publishers referred to a 
merchant’s landing page.  Each online consumer who was directed to LeanSpa’s landing page by 
a LeadClick publisher and enrolled in LeanSpa’s “free trial” program was considered to have 
completed an “action” for which publishers were entitled to payment.  For LeanSpa campaigns, 
LeadClick was obligated to (and did) pay its publishers somewhere around $40.  This payment 
                                                 
 
32 Statement ¶ 32 [Stroz Report ¶ 8; Prokop Dep. 16:9–21, 39:23–40:1]. 
33 HTTP or Hypertext Transfer Protocol is a protocol to exchange information (hypertext) online 
and is the foundation of communication on the World Wide Web. 
34 Statement ¶ 33 [Stroz Report ¶¶ 3, 8–10; Prokop Dep. 81:21–82:12, 83:20–84:4]. 
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represented approximately 85 to 90% of the amount that LeanSpa promised to pay LeadClick.35 
LeadClick was required to pay these amounts to publishers before receiving 
corresponding compensation from LeanSpa.  Although its standard written contract provided 
LeadClick the option to pay commissions to publishers prior to receiving funds from merchants, 
consistent with industry practice LeadClick had unequivocal oral agreements to pay publisher 
commissions within seven to ten days after an action occurred, which was before receiving funds 
from LeanSpa.  LeadClick paid its publishers at least $5 million more than it ever received from 
LeanSpa.  Because LeanSpa went out of business owing LeadClick over $10 million, LeadClick 
never received the funds to reimburse it for its payment of publisher commissions.36 
LeadClick shut down its operations, including the operation of its affiliate network, in 
September 2011.37 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This is a non-jury case.   Summary judgment is appropriate when the record evidence 
demonstrates that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”38  When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a 
court must construe the facts in favor of the nonmoving party and must resolve all ambiguities 
                                                 
 
35 Statement ¶ 34 [Davidson Dep. 17:15–18:12, 41:22–42:10, 199:19–200:2; Chiang Dep. 
179:12–181:19; Chelew Dep. 281:8–282:9]. 
36 Statement ¶ 35 [Chiang Dep. 180:4–181:19; Chelew Dep. 281:8–282:9; Davidson Dep. 
200:10–201:9; Mizhen Dep. 127:7–12] 
37 Statement ¶¶ 1, 35 [Balas Decl. ¶¶ 3-5; Livermore Dep. Ex. 1 (Decl.) at ¶ 2; Zimmerman Decl.  
¶¶ 4, 10]. 
38 FED. R.CIV.P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, (1986). 
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and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant.39  To constitute a “genuine” issue of 
material fact, there must be contradictory evidence “such that a reasonable jury could return a 
verdict for the non-moving party.”40  Of course, in the case at bar, the Court itself, rather than a 
jury, will make the factual determinations.  
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. LeadClick is not liable for the allegedly deceptive advertising of third-party 
publishers, under either the FTC Act or the CUTPA41 
The Complaint charges LeadClick with a violation of the “deceptive” provision of the 
FTC Act; it alleges that the LeadClick Defendants, “directly or through affiliates acting on their 
behalf and for their benefit have represented expressly or by implication” that certain websites 
containing LeanSpa advertisements depicted objective news reports and independent consumer 
comments that were neither objective nor independent.42  But the undisputed facts demonstrate 
that LeadClick had no role whatsoever in creating or publishing these allegedly deceptive 
advertisements, which were crafted and widely used by affiliate marketers long before those 
publishers had any association with LeadClick.  Nor are any of the representations in those 
advertisements attributed to LeadClick. 
                                                 
 
39 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 
574, 587 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970); see also Aldrich v. 
Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir.1992). 
40 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 
41 The CUTPA, Connecticut General Statutes §§ 42-110a–42-110q, provides remedies for unfair 
competition and false and/or deceptive advertising.  The CUTPA specifically states at § 42-
110b(b) that “It is the intent that in construing subsection (a) of this section, the commissioner 
and the courts of this state shall be guided by interpretations given by the [FTC] and the federal 
courts to Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)), as from 
time to time amended.”  Thus, this motion will focus on cases interpreting the FTC Act. 
42 Compl. at ¶¶ 32–34. 
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As discussed more thoroughly below, under Second Circuit law, there is no “aiding and 
abetting” liability under the FTC Act, and a defendant cannot be liable for allegedly deceptive 
advertising unless it made the deceptive claims or such claims were attributed to it. 
1) Liability under the FTC Act requires proof that the allegedly 
deceptive advertising statements were made by or attributed to the 
defendant 
The sole claim against LeadClick is premised upon the “deceptive” prong of FTC Act § 
5(a)(1), which provides simply that “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce …  are … unlawful.”  Notably, no provision of the FTC Act authorizes the FTC to 
pursue a claim for aiding and abetting another in committing an unfair or deceptive trade 
practice, and no language in the statute discusses any type of secondary liability.  As a result, the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of 
Denver, N.A.,43 and its progeny in Second Circuit case law, strongly support the conclusion that 
there is no legal claim for “aiding and abetting” a violation of §5(a)(1) the FTC Act, and that a 
“primary violation” requires publication of or attribution within the deceptive advertising. 
In Central Bank of Denver, the Supreme Court rejected a reading of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) that would have implied a cause of action for aiding 
and abetting into §10(b) of the Exchange Act; he Supreme Court’s conclusion was unequivocal 
and focused solely and squarely on the plain language of the statute: 
If … Congress intended to impose aiding and abetting liability, we presume it 
would have used the words “aid” and “abet” in the statutory text. But it did not. 
We reach the uncontroversial conclusion, accepted even by those courts 
recognizing a § 10(b) aiding and abetting cause of action, that the text of the 
[Exchange] Act does not itself reach those who aid and abet a § 10(b) violation. 
                                                 
 
43 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
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Unlike those courts, however, we think that conclusion resolves the case. It is 
inconsistent with settled methodology in § 10(b) cases to extend liability beyond 
the scope of conduct prohibited by the statutory text. To be sure, aiding and 
abetting a wrongdoer ought to be actionable in certain instances. The issue, 
however, is not whether imposing private civil liability on aiders and abettors is 
good policy but whether aiding and abetting is covered by the statute.44 
This holding makes very clear that the analysis of whether the FTC Act—or any statute—creates 
aiding and abetting liability should be determined by referencing the text of the statute alone.  
Indeed, Central Bank of Denver goes on to explain that the statute must include an express 
provision for aiding and abetting to authorize such a cause of action: 
Congress has not enacted a general civil aiding and abetting statute—either for 
suits by the Government (when the Government sues for civil penalties or 
injunctive relief) or for suits by private parties. Thus, when Congress enacts a 
statute under which a person may sue and recover damages from a private 
defendant for the defendant’s violation of some statutory norm, there is no general 
presumption that the plaintiff may also sue aiders and abettors.45 
No court has yet considered how the Supreme Court’s holding in Central Bank of Denver affects 
the construction of the FTC Act.  The above-quoted text from Central Bank of Denver does 
make clear, however, that the resolution of this inquiry depends heavily on the actual language of 
the FTC Act.  Because there are significant and relevant similarities between the FTC Act and 
the Exchange Act, Central Bank of Denver precludes the FTC from bringing a claim under § 
5(a)(1) on an aiding and abetting theory.§ 10(b) of the Exchange Act is the core anti-fraud 
provision of the statute.  At the time Central Bank of Denver was decided, § 10(b) provided: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange— 
… 
                                                 
 
44 Id. at 177. 
45 Id. at 182. 
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(b)  To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security 
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules 
and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange Commission] may prescribe.46 
Like the Exchange Act, the FTC Act broadly prohibits “deceptive” practices in its sphere of 
regulation.  Indeed, the language in the FTC Act is, if anything, less debatable: the only textual 
argument the Supreme Court seriously considered in Central Bank of Denver was the effect of 
the qualifying phrase “directly or indirectly” in § 10(b).  Unlike the Exchange Act, the FTC Act 
contains no such language. 
Notably, the FTC has publicly acknowledged that it does not have the power to pursue 
aiding and abetting claims under § 5.  In Congressional testimony and correspondence after 
Central Bank of Denver, the FTC, under both the Bush and Obama administrations, has steadily 
acknowledged its inability to bring aiding and abetting claims under § 5(a)(1).  In 2008, then-
Chairman of the FTC, William Kovacic, testified before the Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation in support of a proposal to amend the FTC Act to add an aiding and 
abetting provision to § 5, which Congress ultimately rejected.  Citing Central Bank of Denver, 
Chairman Kovacic testified: 
Since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate 
Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994)...the Commission’s ability to pursue those 
who assist and facilitate unfair or deceptive acts and practices has been 
compromised. The Supreme Court’s broad reasoning in that case cast doubt on 
the argument that Section 5 of the FTC Act could reach “aiding and abetting” 
another person’s violation. Although the Commission has developed alternative 
theories to reach secondary actors, these theories may make liability more 
difficult to prove than if the FTC had specific statutory authority in this area.47 
                                                 
 
46 15 U.S.C. § 78j. 
47 Prepared Statement of the FTC, S. Comm. On Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 
William Kovacic (Apr. 8, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/testimony/ 
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Likewise, in 2009, Congress considered several amendments to the FTC Act in the 
course of evaluating the laws that would ultimately result in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act.  One of those laws, the Consumer Financial Protection Act, H.R. 
3126 (111th Cong.), would have added an aiding and abetting provision to § 5. Then-Chairman 
of the FTC, Jon Leibowitz, wrote to the House of Representatives Committee on Energy and 
Commerce in support of the bill acknowledging that Central Bank of Denver precluded the 
FTC’s exercise of aiding and abetting authority: 
Until the 1994 Supreme Court decision in Central Bank of Denver … which held 
that the SEC did not have aiding and abetting authority under the Exchange 
Act, it was understood that the FTC had aiding and abetting authority under the 
FTC Act. (The SEC's aiding and abetting authority was restored by statute shortly 
after Central Bank of Denver.) Moreover, the FTC currently has aiding and 
abetting authority under the Telemarketing Act, and we have used this 
authority successfully to combat unlawful practices across a wide range of 
products and services that are sold over the telephone. Extending aiding and 
abetting authority to all deceptive and unfair practices would simply put all 
channels of commerce on equal footing. 
… Because of a lack of clear aiding and abetting authority, the FTC is not 
always able to pursue all of the actors responsible for a fraudulent online 
scheme.48 
These statements from successive FTC Chairmen thus clearly acknowledge the demise of any 
type of aiding and abetting liability under the FTC Act after Central Bank of Denver. 
Following Central Bank of Denver’s elimination of secondary liability, the various circuit 
courts took divergent approaches to defining the scope of a primary violation under the 
Exchange Act.  When first presented with the issue, the Second Circuit constructed what has 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
P034101reauth.pdf.  See FED. R. EVID. 201(b); Perez v. Ahlstrom Corp., Order on Mot. to 
Dismiss [ECF No 10] Case No. 10–cv–1299, 2011 WL 2533801, at *2 (D. Conn. June 27, 2011) 
(noting that information on official government website is proper subject of judicial notice). 
48 Letter from Hon. Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed Trade Comm’n, to H. Comm. On Energy & 
Commerce (Oct. 26, 2009) available at http://goo.gl/2ZTm7V (emphasis added). 
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been since termed the “bright line” test for a primary violation, which view the Court reaffirmed 
in 2010.49  That same test should be utilized by this Court to examine the claim against 
LeadClick under the FTC Act. 
To find liability for a primary violation of the Exchange Act in the Second Circuit, this 
“bright line” test prohibits a plaintiff from relying on statements conveyed to the public through 
another source unless those statements are attributed to the defendant.  In Wright v. Ernst & 
Young LLP, the Second Circuit concluded that because reliance by those defrauded is an element 
of a claim under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, the deceptive statements must have been publicly 
attributed to the defendant to render the defendant liable for a primary violation of the statute.50  
In Wright, the plaintiffs brought a private securities action against the auditing firm, alleging that 
Ernst & Young had “provided false and misleading advice to [the underlying company], 
knowing that the advice would be passed on to the investors.”51  Ernst & Young argued that it 
had not made any public statements itself, and that the press releases made by the company, even 
if they included false information that originated with Ernst & Young, made no references to it.  
Ultimately, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case, explaining: 
if Central Bank is to have any real meaning, a defendant must actually make a 
false or misleading statement in order to be held liable under Section 10(b). 
Anything short of such conduct is merely aiding and abetting, and no matter how 
substantial that aid may be, it is not enough to trigger liability under Section 10(b) 
… 
                                                 
 
49 Wright v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 152 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1998); Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC v. 
Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2010). 
50 152 F.3d at 174 (“The Court [in Central Bank of Denver] further observed that authorizing a 
§10(b) cause of action based on aiding and abetting would circumvent the ‘reliance’ 
requirement.”) (citing Central Bank of Denver, 511 at 180). 
51 Wright, 152 F.3d at 172. 
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In this case, [the company’s] press release did not attribute any assurances to 
Ernst & Young and, in fact, did not mention Ernst & Young at all. Thus, 
Ernst & Young neither directly nor indirectly communicated 
misrepresentations to investors. Therefore, the amended complaint failed to 
allege that Ernst & Young made “a material misstatement (or omission) on which 
a purchaser or seller of securities relie[d].” … We therefore agree with the 
district court that holding Ernst & Young primarily liable under the Act “in 
spite of its clearly tangential role in the alleged fraud would effectively revive 
aiding and abetting liability under a different name …52 
In 2010, the Second Circuit reaffirmed the Wright rule and expressly disapproved 
contrary precedent.53 In PIMCO, the plaintiffs brought a securities fraud action against the law 
firm that represented a brokerage firm, alleging that the lawyer facilitated fraud by participating 
in the creation of a registration statement, offering memorandum, and an IPO-registration 
statement that all allegedly contained false information.54  Just as in Wright, none of the 
documents at issue specifically attributed information to the law firm or attorney.  The Court 
reiterated the Wright rule, holding that a plaintiff must “rely on a secondary actor’s own 
deceptive statements, and not on statements conveyed to the public through another source and 
not attributed to the defendants.”55  The Court explained that: 
An attribution requirement makes clear—to secondary actors and investors 
alike—that those who sign or otherwise allow a statement to be attributed to them 
                                                 
 
52 Wright,  152 F.3d at 175 (quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added) (citing 
Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 191; see Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, No. 97-9241, 1997 
WL 563782, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1997). 
53 See Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC. v. Mayer Brown LLP (“PIMCO”), 603 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2010). 
54 Id. at149–50. 
55 Id. at 155–56 (emphasis in original).  In reiterating the “bright line” rule set forth in Wright, the 
PIMCO Court rejected the “creator” standard proposed by both the plaintiffs and SEC.  The 
parties argued that the Wright public-attribution test should not be the only way to establish a 
primary violation, that defendants who created the false statements on which others rely even 
absent public attribution could still be primarily liable; but the Court rejected that proposed 
“creator” standard. 
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expose themselves to liability. Those who do not are beyond the reach of Rule 
10b-5’s private right of action.56 
In the Second Circuit, therefore, a defendant only commits a primary violation of § 10(b) by 
crossing the bright-line test of making a misrepresentation that is publicly attributable to that 
defendant.  “Anything short of such conduct is merely aiding and abetting …”57 
Here, where the FTC is seeking financial relief under § 13(b) of the FTC Act, a 
“deception” claim under § 5(a)(1) of the FTC Act includes a reliance element just like a claim 
under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act.58  Because reliance is an element of a claim under both § 
10(b) of the Exchange Act and § 5 of the FTC Act, the public-attribution standard of Wright and 
PIMCO applies to the FTC Act.59  Although the fact that consumers relied on a particular 
misrepresentation is generally presumed in FTC Act cases if the misrepresentation was made 
publicly and consumers purchased the product,60 that presumption neither extends to nor 
addresses who made the representation relied upon. 
The Second Circuit’s forceful adherence to the public-attribution requirement in the 
Exchange Act demonstrates that, because of the similarities of the elements of the claims, a 
primary violation of the FTC Act can likewise only be predicated upon a showing that the 
deceptive conduct targeted—here the specific alleged misrepresentations in the “news sites”—
                                                 
 
56 Id. at 156. 
57 Id. at 157. 
58 15 U.S.C. § 45; see, e.g., FTC v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1205–06 (10th Cir. 
2005) (collecting cases); FTC v. Medical Billers Network, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008) (citing Freecom Commc’ns, 401 F.3d at 1203 n.6). 
59 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); PIMCO, 603 F.3d at 155–58 . 
60 Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d at 1205–06. 
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was publicly attributed to LeadClick.  Any other standard would effectively revive aiding and 
abetting liability under a different name. 
2) The undisputed evidence—including the testimony of the FTC’s own 
investigators—uniformly demonstrates that the allegedly deceptive 
“news sites” used by third-party publishers were created and used 
prior to any publisher using them on LeadClick’s eAdvertising 
network and did not attribute any representations to LeadClick 
Acting only as an intermediary linking third-party publishers to online merchants, 
LeadClick cannot be held liable for a violation of either the FTC or the CUTPA because it did 
not create or publish any advertisements and nothing in those advertisements was attributed to 
LeadClick.  
LeadClick neither published the “news sites” nor contributed to their allegedly deceptive 
format or content.  Indeed, the precise “news sites” that form the basis of the FTC’s claims 
against LeadClick had been created, published and widely promoted to the public long before 
they were used to generate traffic on the LeadClick affiliate network.  Perhaps the best example 
of this fact comes from the FTC’s own Complaint.  Exhibit A thereto (shown above in Part II.C 
as Illustration 2) is the FTC’s quintessential example of an actionable “news site.”  It purports to 
be a legitimate news report, contains a photograph of “reporter” Julie Ayers, advertises the 
LeanSpa Acai product, and describes the reporter’s claimed use of that product.  But this website 
has absolutely nothing to do with LeadClick. It was used by publisher Andrew Davidson before 
his company, Circa Direct, was running any LeanSpa advertising campaigns with LeadClick.61  
Davidson used the “news site” above-pictured at Illustration 2 to advertise LeanSpa’s products 
through Copeac, a different affiliate network owned by another company unrelated to 
                                                 
 
61 Statement ¶ 14 [Davidson Dep. 178:11–179:8]. 
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LeadClick.62  Not only did Davidson use this website format on the Copeac network, but he used 
the same “news site” format on a variety of affiliate networks.63  Later, when Circa Direct began 
running LeanSpa traffic on the LeadClick network, Davidson did not change the content of his 
website:  
Q. And then when you switched running LeanSpa from this other network to 
LeadClick, you didn't need to change the content of the site at all, the look 
of the site or anything about the site, other than to simply change the link 
so that the click would go to the LeadClick network instead of the network 
you were running it on at the time?  
A. Right, yes.64 
As Davidson testified, there was “nothing unique or different” about the “news sites” that 
he utilized when he advertised for LeanSpa on the LeadClick network as compared with the 
websites he used to advertise LeanSpa products (or other products for that matter) on other 
affiliate networks.65   
This fact is readily apparent from a side-by-side comparison of Davidson’s webpages.  
As seen below in Illustration 3, Exhibit A to the Complaint (on the left) is a “news site” used by 
Davidson to run LeanSpa traffic on the Copeac network before he ever started advertising 
LeanSpa with LeadClick.  And Exhibit C to the Complaint (on the right) is another “news site” 
that he subsequently used to run a LeanSpa campaign on the LeadClick network.  The latter is 
identical in form and substance, purporting to be a legitimate news report and containing the 
same photograph of “reporter” Julie Ayers. 
                                                 
 
62 Id. 
63 Statement ¶ 16 [Davidson Dep. 178:3–6]. 
64 Statement ¶ 15 [Davidson Dep. 179:9–16]. 
65 Statement ¶ 16 [Davidson Dep. 178:3–10]. 
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 Complaint Exhibit A Complaint Exhibit C   
 
Illustration 3 
The FTC’s own investigator, Sally Schools, conclusively confirmed that the concept, 
form and text of these “news sites” were created and widely used by publishers long before 
LeadClick’s involvement with LeanSpa.66  Both Ms. Schools and FTC investigator Douglas 
McKenney agree both that LeadClick was not involved in any way in the creation of the content 
of these “news sites,” and that nothing in the sites attributes anything to LeadClick.67  Every 
witness in this case—from independent third-party publisher Davidson to a former LeadClick 
affiliate manager—confirms that LeadClick had no role whatsoever in the creation of these 
                                                 
 
66 Statement ¶ 19 [Schools Dep. 13:11–24, 38:13–17]. 
67 Statement ¶ 20 [Schools Dep. 14:20–24; McKenney Dep. 173:19–25, 191:9–23]. 
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“news sites.”68 
Likewise, the “news sites” used by publishers in their marketing of the LeanSpa 
defendants’ products indisputably contained no information identifying LeadClick.  Indeed, a 
consumer surfing the Internet and navigating through webpages would be completely unaware of 
LeadClick’s affiliate network software operating in the background.  The involvement of the 
affiliate marketing network—the redirection of Internet traffic and the tracking of clicks and 
sales—was all done “behind-the-scenes” and was wholly invisible to all consumers. 
Because there is nothing about the design, content or attribution of these “news sites” that 
is even remotely related to LeadClick, the company cannot be held liable for violation of the 
FTC Act or the CUTPA. 
B. LeadClick’s affiliate marketing program is a content-neutral “interactive 
computer service” that is entitled to immunity under Section 230 of the CDA 
LeadClick is also immune from liability under Section 230 of the CDA.  LeadClick’s 
affiliate marketing software is a classic example of a content-neutral “interactive computer 
service” that is entitled to statutory immunity for claims based on deceptive advertising 
conducted by independent publishers.  In this case, the FTC seeks to hold LeadClick liable for 
the content on the “news sites” that it has conceded were designed, created and controlled by 
third-party independent publishers who participated in LeadClick’s eAdvertising affiliate 
marketing network. 
The CDA states, in pertinent part, that “No provider or user of an interactive computer 
                                                 
 
68 Statement ¶ 24 [Davidson Dep. 19:23–20:10, 26:11–27:5, 179:21–180:5;  Circa I Dep. 54:8–
55:4; Schools Dep. 14:20–24.;  Chiang Dep. 177:13–178:20, Redmond Dep. 162:13–163:15; 
McKenney Dep. 173:19–25, 191:9–23]. 
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service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.”69  It defines an “interactive computer service” as “any information 
service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by 
multiple users to a computer service, including specifically a service or system that provides 
access to the Internet.”70  And the CDA defines “information content provider” as “any person or 
entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information 
provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”71  Through the CDA, 
Congress created a doctrine of federal immunity against “any cause of action that would make 
service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service.”72  The 
CDA has been held to immunize interactive service providers from both state and federal causes 
of action.73 
  
                                                 
 
69 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
70 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). 
71 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). 
72 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997). Courts in the Second Circuit 
have recognized that the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Zeran represents the most widely accepted 
interpretation of the CDA’s immunity provisions absent guidance from the this circuit. See, e.g., 
Atl. Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 700 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (Chin, 
J.). 
73 See, e.g., Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 531 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff’d, No. 03-
1770, 2004 WL 602711 (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 2004) (finding that AOL is immune from a federal 
civil rights claim that treated it as a publisher); see also Assoc. Bank-Corp. v. Earthlink, Inc., No. 
05-C-0233-S, 2005 WL 2240952 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 13, 2005) (Section 230 of the CDA precluded 
a claim under the Lanham Act, Section 1125(a)); Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under 
Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008) (Section 230 of the CDA immunizes 
Craigslist against Fair Housing Act claims). 
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Courts addressing the CDA have recognized that Congress intended the immunity 
provision to be construed broadly.74  In determining whether a particular defendant is entitled to 
CDA immunity, “[c]ourts engage in a three-party inquiry … i.e. [i] whether Defendant is a 
provider of an interactive computer service; [ii] if the postings at issue are information provided 
by another information content provider; and [iii] whether Plaintiff’s claims seek to treat 
Defendant as a publisher or speaker of third party content.”75  If a defendant meets all three of 
those elements, and if no other exception applies, that defendant is immune from liability under 
the protections of the CDA.76  LeadClick meets the test and is entitled to the broad statutory 
immunity of the CDA. 
1) LeadClick operated and used an “interactive computer service” as 
defined by the CDA 
As described above, courts interpret very broadly the CDA definition of an interactive 
computer service as “any information service, system, or access software provider that provides 
                                                 
 
74 See Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 7735 (RMB), 2009 WL 1704355, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 15, 2009) (“Courts across the country have repeatedly held that the CDA’s grant of 
immunity should be construed broadly”) (internal citations omitted); see also Universal 
Commc’ns Sys. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F. 3d 413, 418 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Zeran, 129 F. 3d at 330–
31) (interpreting CDA immunity “to effectuate Congress’s ‘policy choice … not to deter harmful 
online speech through the … route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve as 
intermediaries for other parties’ potentially injurious messages”); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, 
Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2003) (“reviewing courts have treated § 230(c) immunity 
as quite robust, adopting a relatively expansive definition of ‘interactive computer service’ and a 
relatively restrictive definition of ‘information content provider’”); Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. 
Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985 n.3 (10th Cir. 2003). 
75 Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. QIP Holders, LLC, No. 3:06-cv-01710-VLB, 2010 WL 669870 (D. 
Conn. Feb. 19, 2010) (citation omitted). 
76 See id.; see also Lycos, 478 F. 3d at 418. 
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or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server.” 77  The operation of 
LeadClick’s affiliate marketing network is described in great detail in the accompanying Local 
Rule 56(a)(1) Statement of Undisputed Facts (see ¶¶ 29–33), above in Part II.D and in 
Illustration 1 (see supra at Part II.A).  In sum, LeadClick operated an affiliate marketing software 
platform that managed Internet communications between consumers clicking on publisher 
advertisements and online merchants. 
The unrebutted analysis of one the country’s leading forensic experts, Stroz Friedberg 
LLC, conclusively demonstrates that LeadClick’s affiliate marketing network platform meets the   
definition of an “interactive computer service” by enabling innumerable consumers to access its 
own computer server, as well as the computer servers of merchants.  That conclusion was 
confirmed by the founder and CEO of WebApps and the developer of the HitPath software 
system.  As a result, LeadClick qualifies as a “provider or user of an interactive computer 
service” entitled to CDA immunity. 
2) The allegedly deceptive advertisements at issue were provided by an 
independent “information content provider,” not by LeadClick 
Section 230 of the CDA defines and courts have narrowly interpreted “information 
content provider” as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation 
or development” of the statements at issue.78  In this instance, as described above, Plaintiffs’ 
claims are based on just two specific portions of the “news site” contents: first, that the websites 
                                                 
 
77 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2); See Ascentive, LLC v. Opinion Corp., 842 F. Supp. 2d 450, 473 
(E.D.N.Y. 2011); Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123–24 . 
78 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3); see, e.g., Ramey v. Darkside Prods., Inc., No. 02-730 (GK), 2004 WL 
5550485, at *7 (D.D.C. May 17, 2004) (discussing that courts adopt a “relatively restrictive 
definition of ‘information content provider’” in the context of the CDA). 
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purport to be legitimate “news sites” when they in fact are not actual news websites; and second, 
that the websites contain a comment section that purports to be comprised of real comments 
when the comments are not actually real.79  But the evidence supports that the publishers—rather 
than LeadClick—were responsible for creating, copying, and publishing all of the content in 
these websites.  And the FTC conceded—as far back as April 2011, more than a year before 
suing LeadClick—that third-party “information content providers,” not LeadClick—were 
responsible for those two allegedly deceptive aspects of the “news sites.”80 
3) FTC seeks to treat LeadClick as the speaker of the allegedly deceptive 
advertisements 
There is no doubt that Plaintiffs’ claims seek to treat LeadClick as “a publisher or speaker 
of third party content;” the Complaint is clear on this point.  Plaintiffs allege that “the LeadClick 
Defendants, directly or through affiliates acting on their behalf and for their benefit have 
represented expressly or by implication” that certain websites containing LeanSpa 
advertisements contained objective news reports and independent consumer comments that were 
neither objective nor independent.81 
4) Plaintiffs cannot circumvent CDA 230’s broad grant of immunity by 
asserting that LeadClick was somehow responsible for the 
“development” of the “news sites” at issue 
Plaintiffs cannot circumvent CDA 230’s broad grant of immunity by asserting that 
LeadClick was responsible for the “development” of the “news sites” and was, therefore, itself 
an information content provider.  Although this Court previously denied LeadClick’s motion to 
                                                 
 
79 Compl. at ¶¶ 82–84 (Count 4). 
80 Statement ¶ 13 [Declaration of Sallie S. Schools, FTC v. Circa Direct LLC et al, No. 11-cv-
02172-RMB-AMD (D. N.J. Apr. 16, 2011) [ECF No 3-5] bates nos. FTC-0392–0427[. 
81 Compl. at ¶ 82. 
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dismiss because the Complaint allegations suggested that such a claim was “plausible,”82 
discovery in the case has proven otherwise. 
Courts analyzing Section 230 immunity have held that defendants “develop” content only 
if they either directly participate in creating the specific content that is alleged to be unlawful or 
require users to provide the allegedly unlawful content.83   Liability cannot be based on a theory 
that LeadClick somehow encouraged, monitored or acquiesced in publishers’ use of deceptive 
advertising because such theories would “cut the heart out of Section 230.”84 
In Roommates.com, the Court held that a defendant “helps to develop unlawful content, 
and thus falls within the exception to Section 230, if it contributes materially to the alleged 
illegality of the content.”85  Roommates.com was found to have “developed” content because it 
specifically authored questions that elicited discriminatory preferences and required users of the 
service to answer those questions.86  In the same vein, the Court in Doctor’s Assocs. II denied 
summary judgment application of CDA 230 because a jury might believe plaintiff’s assertion 
that Quiznos was “soliciting disparaging material” and “shaping the eventual content” of the 
actionable representations.87  But here, it is undisputed that the allegedly actionable content in the 
“news sites” was created long before any involvement by LeadClick. 
Even if a fact finder could conclude that LeadClick knew about and encouraged 
                                                 
 
82 See Ruling re: Motions to Dismiss dated January 29, 2013 [ECF No 198] at 11. 
83 Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1174 
(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2009). 
84 Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174. 
85 Id. at 1168. 
86 Id. at 1166. 
87 Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. No. 06-cv-1710, 210 WL at *47. 
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publishers’ use of “news sites,” LeadClick would still be immune.  As one Court has stated, there 
is “simply no authority for the proposition that encouraging the publication of defamatory 
content” makes a defendant responsible, in whole or in part, for the “creation or development” of 
that content.88 
Similarly, any recommendations that LeadClick's personnel may have made about 
product pairing—suggesting which merchant products should be placed together on a publisher’s 
website for sales efficacy—do not relate at all to the allegedly deceptive content that already 
existed on these “news sites” and cannot impact CDA immunity. A defendant does not lose CDA 
immunity by altering or adding non-actionable content or enhancing a site’s commercial 
prominence and visibility to online consumers.89 
Rather, CDA immunity is lost only if a defendant was involved in the creation of the 
                                                 
 
88 Ascentive, LLC, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 473. Accord Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 562 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (“the fact that a website acted in such a manner as to encourage the 
publication of unlawful material does not preclude a finding of immunity pursuant to [Section] 
230”); Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929, 933 (D. Ariz. 
2008) (holding that the ripoffreport.com website was not an information content provider even 
though it allegedly encouraged defamatory reviews by others for its financial benefit); S. C. v. 
Dirty World, LLC, No. 11-CV-00392-DW, 2012 WL 3335284, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 12, 2012) 
(“As a matter of law, and even if true, encouraging defamatory posts is insufficient to defeat 
CDA immunity”). 
89 Mitan v. A Neumann & Assocs., No. 08-6154, 2010 WL 4782771 (D. N.J. Nov. 17, 2010) 
(defendant that added non-defamatory language to an allegedly defamatory email before 
forwarding to others was protected by CDA 230); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 
2003) (minor alterations and editing); Asia Econ. Inst. v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, 2011 WL 
2469822, at *6 (C.D.Cal. May 4, 2011) (citing Black v. Google Inc., No. 10-02381 CW, 2010 
WL 3222147, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 13, 2010)) (defendant consumer report website's deliberate 
manipulation of webpage code to make certain reports more visible in online search results was 
immune under Section 230 because “[a]bsent a changing of the disputed reports’ substantive 
content that is visible to consumers, liability cannot be found”"). 
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precise content that is alleged to be actionable.90  Any broader interpretation of the term 
“develop” would wrench the meaning out of Section 230: 
It's true that the broadest sense of the term ‘develop’ could include the functions 
of an ordinary search engine—indeed, just about any function performed by a 
website. But to read the term so broadly would defeat the purposes of section 230 
by swallowing up every bit of the immunity that the section otherwise provides.91 
Stripping affiliate network operators of CDA immunity by holding them responsible for 
“developing” publisher content would contravene the express policy statement proclaiming the 
United States’ desire “to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists 
for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State 
regulation.”92  What the Ninth Circuit cautioned against for websites applies even more aptly to 
affiliate networks: 
Websites are complicated enterprises, and there will always be close cases where 
a clever lawyer could argue that something the website operator did encouraged 
the illegality. Such close cases, we believe, must be resolved in favor of 
immunity, lest we cut the heart out of section 230 by forcing websites to face 
death by ten thousand duck-bites, fighting off claims that they promoted or 
encouraged—or at least tacitly assented to — the illegality of third parties. Where 
it is very clear that the website directly participates in developing the alleged 
illegality — as it is clear here with respect to Roommate's questions, answers and 
the resulting profile pages—immunity will be lost. But in cases of enhancement 
by implication or development by inference—such as with respect to the 
“Additional Comments” here—section 230 must be interpreted to protect 
websites not merely from ultimate liability, but from having to fight costly and 
                                                 
 
90 Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1125 (even if matchmaking site contributed to structure and content, 
immunity would still bar claim unless defendant “created or developed the particular information 
at issue”); Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 717 n. 11 (2002) (eBay’s delivery of non-
actionable content “is irrelevant if eBay did not itself create or develop the content for which 
appellants seek to hold it liable”). 
91 Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1167. 
92 47 U.S.C. §230(b)(2). 
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protracted legal battles.93 
5) Neither knowledge nor profit motive is material to CDA immunity 
LeadClick’s general knowledge about publishers’ use of “news sites” to advertise 
products online utilizing affiliate marketing programs also does not destroy its CDA immunity.  
Whether LeadClick had specific knowledge about its publishers’ allegedly deceptive advertising 
likewise has no bearing on LeadClick’s entitlement to immunity: 
It is, by now, well established that notice of the unlawful nature of the information 
provided is not enough to make it the service provider's own speech. We confirm 
that view and join the other courts that have held that Section 230 immunity 
applies even after notice of the potentially unlawful nature of the third-party 
content.94 
Courts have been unequivocal in ruling that knowledge of deceptive conduct is irrelevant to the 
question of CDA immunity.95 
Likewise, the fact that LeadClick sought (albeit unsuccessfully) to make a profit is 
irrelevant to CDA immunity.  That an entity “operates a commercial business or makes a profit 
has no relevance to the immunity determination.”96  Numerous courts have found interactive 
computer services to be entitled to CDA immunity where the websites were operating as part of a 
                                                 
 
93 Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d at 1174–75. 
94 See also Lycos, Inc., 478 F. 3d at 420. 
95 See id.; StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 560 (holding ticket exchange website immune under Section 
230 notwithstanding plaintiff's allegations that it knew of or encouraged ticket scalping in 
violation of state law); Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 306 (D. N.H. 
2008) (citing Universal, 478 F. 3d 413, 420) (internal citation omitted) (“‘notice of the unlawful 
nature of the information provided is not enough to make it the service provider’s own speech’ 
under § 230”); Cisneros v. Yahoo!, Inc. et al., No. CGC-040433518, at *12 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Dec. 
10, 2008), available at http://goo.gl/b7JWNK (citing Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 658 (7th 
Cir. 2003) (whether entities know about the information’s content is irrelevant to the application 
of Section 230). 
96 StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d at 560. 
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for-profit business.97  And courts have gone further to opine that not only can interactive 
computer services operate a for-profit business and still retain CDA immunity, but it may also 
take actions to try and increase its profits, including “instructing posters of ads on how to best 
increase the impact of those ads” without defeating immunity.98 
LeadClick is indisputably entitled to CDA immunity.  The company was a “provider or 
user” of an “interactive computer service” but Plaintiffs are seeking to hold LeadClick liable for 
the content of “news sites” that they concede were created, copied, and hosted by independent, 
third-party publishers.  Nothing LeadClick is alleged to have done, whether possessing 
knowledge about the allegedly deceptive practices of its publishers or operating what it intended 
to be a for-profit business, removed it from eligibility for CDA immunity. 
C. The equitable monetary relief sought by the FTC is a type of ancillary relief 
that cannot be awarded when an injunction is improper, and the amount 
being sought does not—as it should—take into account the funds that 
LeadClick was contractually obligated to pass onto third parties 
1) Equitable monetary relief is improper where an injunction is 
improper because it is an ancillary relief intended to help make 
permanent relief possible 
As clearly articulated in United States v. W.T. Grant, 99 “[t]he purpose of an injunction is 
                                                 
 
97 Goddard v. Google, Inc., No. C-08-2738-JF (PVT), 2008 WL 5245490, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 
17, 2008) (“the fact that a website elicits online content for profit is immaterial; the only relevant 
inquiry is whether the interactive service provider ‘creates’ or ‘develops’ that content.”) 
(citations omitted); Cisneros, No. CGC-040433518, at *12 available at http://goo.gl/b7JWNK 
(“the fact that defendants’[sic] made money from selling internet access to sponsored sites [is] 
irrelevant to the application of Section 230”). 
98 M.A. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1050 (E.D. Mo. 2011) (“The 
complained-of actions taken by [defendant] to increase the revenues it derives from its website, 
e.g., touting its website as a ‘highly tuned marketing site’ and instructing posters of ads on how 
to best increase the impact of those ads, does not defeat § 230 immunity”). 
99 345 U.S. 629, 633–35 (1953). 
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to prevent future violations.”100  Although it is possible for an injunction to be utilized “without a 
showing of past wrongs … the moving party must satisfy the court that the relief is needed.”101  
To demonstrate that an injunction is necessary, the moving party must prove that “there exists 
some cognizable danger of recurrent violation, something more than the mere possibility which 
serves to keep the case alive.”102 
The circumstances of this case unequivocally demonstrate that there is no basis for 
issuing an injunction against the single remaining corporate conduct defendant. LeadClick 
Media, Inc., which ran the LeadClick affiliate network, was shut down in 2011 and does not even 
exist as an entity.  It was among a set of entities that had been acquired, and which through 
various corporate transactions, became a subsidiary of CoreLogic, Inc. (“CoreLogic”).  
CoreLogic is a reputable publicly traded company and leading global property information, 
analytics and data-enabled services provider.  CoreLogic’s management shut down LeadClick’s 
operations on September 30, 2011, and terminated its employees—more than two and a half 
years ago and 10 months before LeadClick was added to this lawsuit.103  
In December 2011, the non-operational LeadClick Media, Inc. was transformed into 
LeadClick Media, LLC, a California limited liability company, which remains a non-operational 
subsidiary of CoreLogic.  LeadClick Media, LLC has never had any operations.  LeadClick 
Media, LLC never operated an affiliate marketing network, and there is no prospect that it will 
                                                 
 
100 Id. at 633 (citing Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 326 (1928)). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Statement ¶¶ 1-2 [Balas Decl. ¶¶ 2-4].  
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ever, in any way, become involved with publishers using “news sites.”104  There is no possible 
basis for enjoining the activities of LeadClick Media, LLC.   
Rather, the FTC has already obtained all necessary and appropriate injunctive relief in 
this case.  It has entered into stipulated injunctions with the LeanSpa defendants [ECF No. 274], 
with the former manager of LeadClick’s affiliate marketing program, defendant Richard Chiang 
[ECF No. 286], and with publisher Andrew Davidson and his company Circa Direct.105  Any 
further injunctive relief is both unnecessary and unwarranted. 
Because there is no prospect of future activity by the sole remaining defendant in this 
case, the FTC cannot establish that an injunction is needed.  As a result, no other equitable relief 
can be granted and this entire case must be resolved in favor of LeadClick because it is outside 
the scope of the FTC’s enforcement power under 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).  
The FTC’s federal court enforcement and litigation authority is predicated solely on the 
language in § 53(b) providing that “in proper cases the Commission may seek, and after proper 
proof, the court may issue, a permanent injunction.”106  Numerous courts have held that the 
FTC’s power to enjoin includes any other ancillary equitable relief necessary to effectuate the 
exercise the exercise of powers granted under § 13(b).107  “The power to grant ancillary relief 
                                                 
 
104 Statement ¶ 3 [Balas Decl. ¶¶ 5-6]. 
105 Statement ¶ 38  [FTC v. Circa Direct, LLC, et al., Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for 
Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, Case 1:11-cv-02172-RMB-AMD [ECF No 
55], October 17, 2011, available online at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/10/121019 circastiporder.pdf ] 
106 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). 
107See FTC v. Medical Billers, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 323–324 (citing FTC v. Verity Int’l Ltd., 443 
F.3d 48, 66 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits had 
concluded that § 13(b) permitted restitution or other ancillary equitable relief). 
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includes the power to order repayment of money for consumer redress as restitution or 
rescission.”108  But the power to order repayment of funds for consumer redress is a type of 
ancillary relief; accordingly, where an injunction is improper, such ancillary relief is also 
improper.109  Because § 13(b) “has been interpreted as granting a court the authority to order a 
defendant to pay restitution as ancillary relief to effectuate a permanent injunction,” where there 
is no permanent to be effectuated, monetary relief is improper.110 
This case is the rare case that is not a “proper case[]”111 under the FTC Act because it fails 
the test for the propriety of a permanent injunction under United States v. W.T. Grant.112  Without 
an appropriate permanent injunction, the FTC’s ability to seek equitable monetary relief likewise 
vanishes.  Accordingly, in this case, the FTC’s request for monetary relief should be dismissed. 
2) If the Court determines that some equitable monetary relief is proper, 
the FTC can only recover the amount of money that LeadClick 
received from injured consumers and was not obligated to pass on to 
its publishers 
Assuming arguendo that equitable monetary relief is proper—which it is not—the FTC 
can only recover as equitable monetary relief the amount of money that LeadClick retained from 
                                                 
 
108 FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 1997); see also FTC v. Ameridebt, 373 F. Supp. 2d 
558, 563 (D. Md. 2005). 
109 See e.g., See also FTC v. Ross et al., No. 1:08-cv-03233-RDB [ECF No 262] (D. Md. 
September 24, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/ 
2012/10/121002winfixeropinion.pdf. In FTC v. Ross, the district court explained that “As a 
permanent injunction can be imposed on Ms. Ross, she may also be liable for monetary 
damages,” id. (emphasis added), suggesting that if a permanent injunction cannot be imposed on 
a party, the party may not also be liable for monetary damages. 
110 FTC v. Medical Billers Network, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d at 323–324 (citing FTC v. Febre, 128 
F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added)). 
111 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). 
112 United States v. W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. 629 (1953). 
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its affiliate network activities, namely the amount received from LeanSpa and not distributed to 
LeadClick’s publishers.  However, that amount is zero.  In fact, LeadClick lost millions of 
dollars in its operation of its affiliate marketing for LeanSpa advertising campaigns.  LeadClick 
was victimized by LeanSpa’s refusal to pay its bills, and LeadClick wound up paying its 
publishers over $5 million more than it ever received LeanSpa.  
Under applicable Second Circuit law, appropriate restitution is based on a defendant’s 
gross receipt of consumer funds but must not include revenue that the defendant was 
contractually obligated to pass on to others.113  This rule, recently acknowledged in FTC v. 
Bronson Partners, LLC,114 was first established in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.115  
As the Bronson Court described: 
In Sheldon, the defendants contracted to share a set percentage of their profits 
with a third party.  Our Court found that the defendants’ unjust gains did not 
include the profits they were contractually obligated to pass on to the third party 
… [and held that “t]he payments were never profits of the defendants at all; the 
contracts effectively laid hold of them the moment they came into existence”…116 
In light of this “unusual profit-sharing arrangement,” the defendant could not be required to 
return consumer funds that had been contractually passed on to others, and which were no longer 
in its possession. 
This case presents an identical situation: LeadClick agreed to pay its publishers a set 
                                                 
 
113 FTC v. Verity, 443 F.3d at 67–69 (the “appropriate measure for restitution is the benefit 
unjustly received by the defendants”); FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 F.3d 359, 375 n.10 
(2d Cir. 2011) (noting vitality of Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 
1939)). 
114 Id. 
115 106 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1939). 
116 654 F.3d 359, 375 n.10 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Sheldon, 106 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1939)). 
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amount for each referred online consumer who enrolled in LeanSpa’s online promotion.  
LeadClick was obligated to pay, and did indeed pay, its publishers on a quick turnaround—
typically within 7 to 10 days of the consumer’s enrollment.117  This distribution was usually 
significantly before LeadClick received payment from LeanSpa.118  Although the payment 
protocol left LeadClick at financial risk, it was standard in the industry.119 
To LeadClick’s great distress, LeanSpa never fulfilled its obligations.  LeanSpa failed to 
pay LeadClick at least $10 million due for affiliate advertising.  Although LeadClick did receive 
some funds from LeanSpa, by the time LeadClick went out of business, the company had paid to 
its publishers over $5 million more than it collected from the LeanSpa advertising.120  In sum, 
LeadClick has not retained any consumer funds that can be the basis of equitable restitution. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should find that (1) LeadClick is not liable under 
either the FTC Act or the CUTPA, and (2) that any such liability is precluded by the immunity 
granted to LeadClick by CDA Section 230.  If it reaches the question of relief, the Court should 
determine (3) that Plaintiffs’ request for monetary relief is legally improper and, (4) that 
Plaintiffs cannot seek recovery of consumer funds contractually disbursed to others. 
                                                 
 
117 Statement ¶ 35 
118 Statement ¶ 35 
119 Statement ¶ 35 
120 Notably, the FTC is fully aware that these funds have been contractually delivered to the 
affiliate marketers, and has sought and obtained disgorgement of these funds in independent 
legal proceedings. See e.g., FTC v. Circa Direct, LLC, et al., Stipulated Final Judgment and 
Order for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, Case 1:11-cv-02172-RMB-AMD 
[ECF No 55], October 17, 2011, available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
cases/2012/10/121019circastiporder.pdf (stipulated settlement amount of $11,500,000.00). The 
agency cannot be allowed a second recovery in this action. 
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